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The role of Croatia in
the Expansion of the European
Union and NATO
Janko Vranyczany-Dobrinovic
Although parts of the Croatian public opin-
ion and inadequately informed media take the view
that the relations between Croatia and the European
Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
are only just beginning, with Croatia standing be-
fore the closed doors of institutionalized relation-
ship without clearly defined intentions and visions,
it is important to stress at the outset that this view is
wrong. On the contrary, the relations are well-de-
veloped, the diplomatic exchanges from both sides
highly intensive, and the relationships very intricate,
one might almost say atypical and falling outside
the usual norms of diplomatic conduct.
lt is important to note
also that the diplomatic cir-
cuit in Zagreb, consisting of
representatives of different
countries as well as inter-
national governmental and
non-governmental organi-
zations, including the E.U.




makes systematic and de-
termined efforts to correct
the assessments that are oc-
casionally one-sided and
insufficiently deep. It
makes moves, often suc-
cessful and on occasion less
so, to provide a more bal-
anced picture and shed ad-
ditional light on the situa-
tion, blunting the sharp
edges and relativizing and
reconciling opposing
views. It certainly tries to
avoid crude labelling, un-
supported by arguments,
which can only exacerbate problems. This is a diffi-
cult and exhausting task in view of the large number
of opinion and decision makers and the multiplicity
of interests. In an age of electronic communication,
our manoeuvring space is fairly limited.
I must add also that we suffer from a shortage
of professional people with international experience
in foreign-policy marketing and lobbying. Equally,
the funds needed for such activities are in short sup-
ply. For these reasons, this segment of our activity is
not as effective as we would like it to be.
lt goes without saying that diplomatic repre-
sentatives have the task to prepare clear, unbiased,
unemotional and confiden-
tial messages for their gov-
ernments, giving their as-
sessment of the situation
and their views and com-
ments on the intentions and
forthcoming moves of the
individual governments or,
as in our case, large agglom-
erations of governments.
Diplomatic representatives
must formulate their mes-
sages without regard for
how well or how badly they
will be received by those for
whom they are intended.
Since Croatia's rela-
tions with the North Atlan-
tic Treaty Organization are
clearer and simpler, more
attention will be devoted in
what follows to our relations
with the European Union,
which are more complex,
more intricate, and - to use
the expression favoured by
our Foreign Minister - in-
deed "multilayered".
NATO wishes to have relations with
stable and well-organized states
within clear and stable borders. At
the same time the EU is undergoing
a continuous, complex and
long-term process of socio-political
harmonization, involving the
standardization of legislation,
establishment of common external
borders and introduction of a
common monetary system.
Croatia undoubtedly belongs to the
Christian, Central-European and
Mediterranean civilizational circle.
In the period of the intention of
international community to extend
the ancient border of the European
civilization to the Black Sea by
europeanizing of the unstable
Balkans Croatia has a very
important geographic position.
The international community
believes that real stabilization of
that region could be achieved only
by economic development, and
broader economic cooperation.
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Although 12 of the 16 NATO members are
also members of the fifteen-strong European Union
and thus seemingly guided by the same political in-
structions of their governments and the common
view that membership in the two organizations is
open exclusively to totally open democratic societ-
ies, their thinking begins to differ when specific cases
are brought up.
NATO is a combination of a political-ideo-
logical (formerly strongly anticommunist) and de-
fence-security (formerly anti-Warsaw Pact) group-
ing, with highly complex and sophisticated tasks,
standard organization and weapons purchase. The
leading voice in the organization is that of the United
States, without whose approval no major decision
can be passed. From the global security aspect,
NATO wishes to have relations with stable and well-
organized states within clear and stable borders.
The European Union, for its part, is a predomi-
nantly economic grouping undergoing a continuous,
complex and long-term process of socio-political
harmonization, involving the standardization ofleg-
islation, establishment of common external borders
and introduction of a common monetary system. It
has the common European Parliament, which will
gradually be given increasing powers. The common
world view and social component, democracy, simi-
lar social systems and common philosophy are gain-
ing in importance alongside the economic compo-
nent. They are firmly and explicitly based on recon-
ciliation, humanism, mutual respect and partnership,
and reduced nationalism.
This is the system that will continue to de-
velop, and in the process the Republic of Croatia
will undoubtedly join it over time.
While NATO and the United States have a
much broader geographic perspective and much larger
interest and security concerns, as well as more spe-
cific responsibilities and relations with, for instance,
Russia and the countries of the former Soviet Union,
the Caucasus, the Middle East, North Africa, the Per-
sian Gulf, South and East Asia, etc., the European
Union limits its attempts at economic, ideological and
political unification to a more specifically defined and
more narrow geographical area - that of its present
members and candidates. This process goes deeper
and is socially more far-reaching than the mere mem-
bership in the North Atlantic Alliance.
The Position of the Republic of Croatia
What is the position of the Republic of Croatia
in relation to these two organizations and their dif-
ferences?
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Both organizations followed, joined (each in
its way) and influenced the process of disintegra-
tion of Yugoslavia. We shall not go into the details
of their involvement and their failure to act in the
conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or into
the reasons for the American change of policy at a
later stage of the conflict in the region.
The courageous and effective Croatian de-
fence in the Patriotic Defence War against a still
existing powerful communist army earned Croatia
general sympathy and admiration of all the mem-
bers of these organizations (with two notable excep-
tions), especially of NATO, in which the spirit of
anticommunism and anti-Warsaw Pact was still alive.
The two members who did not show such sympathy
regretted the loss of influence in the region that they
had enjoyed as a result of the Treaty of Versailles
and the AVNOJ arrangements for Yugoslavia. The
early sympathy for Croatia gradually evaporated, es-
pecially among our German friends, giving way to
disappointment and growing criticism. The reason
was a feeling among some people that Croatia was
establishing an authoritarian single-party regime
which was at odds with its Euro-Atlantic aspirations.
Another reason was the evolution of Croatian poli-
cies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the worsening con-
flict with the Bosnian Muslims. The Croats, initially
seen as victims of aggression, were now accused of
banding together with the aggressor to attack an in-
ternationally recognized victim. In this context, our
critics did not wish to consider the possibility that
the Muslims, too, might have contributed to the out-
break of the conflict. Much of the international com-
munity and its public opinion expected the Croats,
as a nation belonging to the civilized "European
circle", to show qualities of chivalry in defending
the new and even more brutally attacked victim and
thus vitally contribute to the resolution of the
Bosnian crisis.
The ever-present anti-Croatian propaganda
succeeded in strengthening the international percep-
tion of Croatia as the negotiating partner of the ag-
gressor in an attempt to carve up the internationally
recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This per-
ception was strengthened following Croatian mili-
tary actions and detentions of Muslims in Mostar
and the surrounding region, the demolition of the
Old Bridge, and the cruelties in the Lasva Valley
and some other parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Such an international perception was damag-
ing for Croatia, and it had numerous negative con-
sequences. It improved a little, though still not suf-
ficiently, following Croatia's military successes in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which broke the stalemate and
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made possible the Dayton Accords. Even today
Croatia continues to be judged cautiously and with
reservations, often without well-founded reasons.
Some people fear that it might have a hidden and
unclear agenda regarding the constitutional provi-
sions for Bosnia-Herzegovina and the implementa-
tion of the Dayton Accords - this despite the lifting
of the blockade of Bihac, the decisive contributions
to the realization of the Dayton agreements, the posi-
tive developments in the process of transition, the
cooperation with the Hague tribunal, the efforts to
develop special relations with the Federation and the
state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the successful
peaceful integration of the Croatian Danube Region.
To return to our relations with NATO, they
have always been exceptionally open, cordial, un-
complicated, friendly and partner-like. This was true
and remained to be true when Croatia was interna-
tionally recognized, and has remained true until the
present day. Without a partnership agreement, we
continue to have a series of talks, visits, personal
communications, exchange of messages and confi-
dential information. This has made it possible at
many decisive moments during these years to trans-
mit to the President and Supreme Commander and
to the Minister of Defence the views, concerns, warn-
ings, sometimes neutral attitudes, of the NATO
Council regarding the developments such as the con-
flict in the Neretva Valley, the Bosnians' abortive
attempt to build the port of Neum, the conflicts in
the Lasva Valley, the Bihac area and south-western
Bosnia, the beginning of the u.S. involvement,
Croatian military moves in the UNPAs, etc. Many
of these moves were accompanied by public expres-
sions of disapproval, sometimes by turning a blind
eye, often by fixing maximum lines and deadlines,
all of which helped to confirm and supplement
Ambassador Galbraith's direct messages on these
Issues.
Let us now try to take a sober look at the com-
mon stand that NATO and the E.U. have in relation
to this region.
While respecting the civilizational and eco-
nomic specificities and differences of the countries
in the wider region, recognizing that Croatia belongs
for the most part to the more narrow Christian and
Central European and Mediterranean civilizational
circle, the international community intends to ex-
tend the ancient border of the European civilization
on the River Una, valid until the Berlin Congress,
by some 950 km to the east, all the way to the Black
Sea, taking in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Romania,
and Bulgaria.
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The disintegration of Yugoslavia, helped along
by the unrealistically exaggerated aspirations of the
Serbian politician Milosevic and the more realistic
achievements of the Croatian President Tudman, pro-
vided the historic opportunity to arrange, by inter-
national consensus, the relations in the traditionally
unstable and sensitive south-east of the European
continent with a population of some 70 million. Ever
since the Vienna and the Berlin Congress, through
the Balkan Wars, the assassination in Sarajevo, the
treaties of Versailles, Trianon and St. Germain, the
Yalta meeting, and the break-up of the Warsaw Pact,
this region has been chronically unstable and unbal-
anced, with numerous, multi-layered and not easily
fulfilled claims and counterclaims. A short lull -
short from a historical perspective - occurred in the
region during Tito's rule, but this interim arrange-
ment did not have the makings of a permanent solu-
tion.
International Community and the Balkans
The international community does not have a
clear definition of the Balkans, and the boundaries
vary depending on whether one relies on geogra-
phy, history, religion, schisms, Ottoman conquests,
etc. The tenn is generally applied to a state of politi-
cal instability in a part of Europe, ethnic and reli-
gious mixture and intolerance, mentality of revenge,
myths, archaic social backwardness, arrogance and
pride, spitefulness, blatant lies, cowardice at one
moment and courage at another.
Milosevic with his imperialist and aggressive
manner and Tudman and Kucan in a realistic and
non-aggressive manner (the latter succeeding in leav-
ing the Balkan scene altogether) helped to create a
situation in which the Balkans can be gradually and
finally "debalkanized" and a solution can be found
for the very complex issue deriving from the col-
lapse and disintegration of the Ottoman and Austro-
Hungarian Empires (which has remained unsolved
until the present day despite the various Balkan wars
and different versions of Yugoslavia).
It is paradoxical that this opportunity should
arise out of an unforeseen international constella-
tion triggered off by tragic conflicts provoked by the
weakening Yugoslav People's Army and paramili-
tary units (the same forces that are now fighting per-
haps their last battles in Kosovo).
The international constellation was created by
the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the
Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union and Tito's Yugosla-
via, and the emergence of new, more naturally bal-
anced states and the simultaneous expansion and
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strengthening of the European Union. The two ma-
jorpowers, the E.U. and the U.S. (the latter working
through NATO) are today assuming the role of arbi-
ters in the Balkans that Austria-Hungary played in
its time (politically inadequate though its efforts
might have been in the face of Russia's opposition
and Greater Serbian aspirations, which highjacked
the Yugoslav ideas of other South Slav ethnic groups
for their own ends).
Today there is emptiness in what were the lines
of confrontation of the superpowers in the former
Yugoslavia, and there is little likelihood of the Rus-
sian presence making itself felt. The whole region
needs to be reconciled, democratized, and economi-
cally, communicationally and energy-wise firmly
integrated in accordance with the visions of NATO
and the European Union. Russia should be included
in the process, but without any decisive influence
and status.
This would mean debalkanizing and
europeanizing the whole geographic space between
the Adriatic and the River Una and the Aegean Sea
(with Greece already a member of the Euro-Atlantic
organizations), possibly before the start of negotia-
tions on Turkey's admission to the European Union.
This may be seen also as the "Scandina-
vization" of the region as envisaged by President
Tudman, provided that the Croatian President con-
vinces the international community that he is ready
to accept Bosnia-Herzegovina as a separate state, to
renounce any territorial claims on the parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina with the Croatian majority, and to find
acceptable ways of stopping the interference in the
financial, customs and payments competencies of
an internationally recognized sovereign state, which
the international community finds highly irritating.
This concept of gradual reconciliation and
expansion of the E.U. and NATO all the way to Varna
and beyond does not reckon with the still present.
ideas of dividing the region along schismatic,
civilizational, Yalta-drawn imaginary boundaries and
intellectual speculations of people like Huntington,
Kissinger and Claes. Still less does it reckon with
the revival of a new, unstable Yugoslavia. Rather, it
envisages the creation of new constellations at the
time of shortening distances and relativized narrowly
national aspirations in the context of global electronic
and satellite communication.
In the present, historically unprecedented situ-
ation, there is no longer a structured "other side",
either as a partner or as an opponent in an attempt to
divide the region. This makes possible a unidirec-
tional spread of global Euro-Atlantic security, eco-
nomic and market interests.
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Bosnia-Herzegovina is at present undergoing
the process of creation of a temporary Euro-Ameri-
can protectorate-type condominium, while in Alba-
nia, despite the chaotic and undemocratic situation,
a permanent NATO base is being built to support
the more important base at Vicenza in Italy. The base
at Kaposvar in Hungary will be situated near the main
Trans- European transport corridor: Copenhagen-
Berlin-Prague-Bratislava-Budapest-Salonica. There
will be also NATO facilities in Croatia.
It is the interest and expressed wish of the in-
ternational community to achieve a clear and last-
ing stability in the countries of the former Yugosla-
via and in the entire region extending from the River
Sutla to the Black Sea. For this, there is a general
consensus.
Whether we like it or not, Croatia is seen as
belonging to this region - not in civilizational terms,
but in terms of its importance for the existence of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, its long semicircular border
with the Balkan Bosnia-Herzegovina, the particular
function of its port of Ploce, its common borders
with Serbia and Montenegro, and finally its role as
a signatory and guarantor of the Dayton Accords.
Austria, which took over the presidency of the
European Union on 1 July 1998, stresses its support
for the interests of the present-day national states
emerging from the earlier multinational grouping of
peoples in Central Europe. It also recognizes its role
as a bridge between the West and the East and South-
east, which was noted also by Pope John Paul II dur-
ing his last visit to Austria.
In this large geographic space between the
River Sutla and the Black Sea, plagued by emotive
national spasms and revindications, Croatia is per-
haps the greatest civilizational heir to the legacy of
the former Central European monarchy - not its
negative traits such as the predominant position of
the Austrians and Hungarians over the other nations,
but its positive traits and traditions, which prompted
Churchill to say that it had been "the best structure
in Europe before the creation of a community of
European nations". This common past within a
multicultural community is the source of tolerance
and multiethnic coexistence. With its rich Central
European and Mediterranean cultural and historical
heritage, with Illyrian-Roman, Old Croatian,
Carolinguian, Romanic, Gothic, Renaissance, Ba-
roque, Biedermeier, Sezession, and modem compo-
nents, and natural beauty of the sub-Alpine,
Pannonian, Dinaric, Karst, and Mediterranean en-
vironment, Croatia is in itself a small European mi-
crocosm (somewhat balkanized since 1918) possess-
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things function in accordance with the human mea-
sure. This truly rich legacy enables it to take a lead
in building a specifically Croatian multiethnic soci-
ety with Euro-humanistic components and to assume
the role of a link, cultural and economic source of
radiation, and participant in positive communication
in all areas and all directions.
Opportunity for Croatia
The international community believes that the
long-awaited stabilization in the region can be
achieved only in parallel with the process of recon-
ciliation and economic development, beginning with
broader regional economic cooperation to prepare
and determine the future European architecture of
the entire region. This is the strategic essence of the
so-called regional approach and the accompanying
conditions as drafted by the Italian diplomat Amadeo
de Franchis and adopted on 24 February 1997. Eu-
rope and NATO are thus extending the European
space by several hundred kilometres, all the way to
the Black Sea, which somewhat relativizes the posi-
tion of Croatia and its civilizational and geographic
specificities in a region with many unresolved dis-
putes, but at the same time presents it with an op-
portunity to playa particular role in the process. This
is the opportunity that we should not miss. We should
note that the European Union and the international
community, every organization and each key mem-
ber of such an organization, intend - without a real
rush - to turn this region into a big Euro-Atlantic
building site for many tens of years to come. This
will also be a major market for Croatian goods and
stimulate foreign investments that aim to reach larger
markets.
In the opinion of some present and former dis-
tinguished statesmen and high officials of the Euro-
pean Union (Chirac, Mock, Cossiga, Kinkel,
Schussel, Burghardt, and others), the Croatian Presi-
dent - whose unrelenting energy and pragmatic cau-
tion enabled Croatia to become internationally rec-
ognized as a sovereign state - should continue and
complete his historic mission by supplementing his
more narrow nationalism with additional statesman-
like visions of reconciliation, forgiveness, and coex-
istence of recently rebellious and mutually hostile eth-
nic groups. He should continue to build a tolerant,
democratic and law-based state and to bring such a
state as a small but regionally important member into
the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, providing a regional model of an at-
tractive, democratic economic and political partner.
This would make the Croatian President a pil-
131
lar, support and adviser to Euro-Atlantic statesmen
in the inevitable process sketched above.
The map of the main economic, investment
and development zones shows that the main such
zone extends from southern England, through cen-
tral Germany to northern Italy. A rather broad pe-
ripheral zone of development covers northern and
central Croatia, the regions of Maribor, Vienna,
Prague, Berlin, southern Sweden and the Baltic
states, extending to Moscow and taking in parts of
Hungary and Poland. A large part of Croatia lies on
the edges of the Vienna-Prague-Berlin zone.
Croatia is not expected at this moment - and
this needs to be properly understood - to participate
in the design of the region up to and including the
Black Sea by providing complementary assistance
to its former partners in the Central European em-
pire of Austria-Hungary, such as Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Slovenia. How-
ever, it is expected to provide significant assistance
to its former partners in the former Yugoslavia and
the neighbouring countries. This is a somewhaten-
larged region with which Croatia does not have any
traditional, civilizational or religious links. The un-
fortunate links that it has are marked by recent ex-
perience and present-day realities, the geographic
position and communication lines. For the Brussels-
based organizations, this is a region that requires sta-
bility, reconciliation, reconstruction, development,
and opening of communication lines. This, in fact,
is the essence, in the European view, of the notori-
ous "regional approach" supported also by the United
States (SECI). An important geopolitical role in this
process will be played - apart from Croatia - by Hun-
gary, Serbia (present-day Yugoslavia), Bulgaria, and
the strategically important Albania.
From Croatian perspective, the objection to
the regional approach is that the sovereign state,
member of the United Nations and the Council of
Europe, though young and newly emerged on the
international scene, is not allowed to choose its own
"preferred partners", groupings and clubs. Instead,
these choices are imposed upon it in a paternalistic
manner, supposedly well-intended, and yet meant
to squeeze it into a club of politically, economically
and psychologically "non-preferred" partners that it
has only recently and with great effort managed to
get rid of. The international community is not likely
to give up this concept, but this is not to say that it
cannot be gradually relativized and more flexibly
and selectively applied in different countries. Croatia
has a special role to play in this concept, with spe-
cial future opportunities, but equally with special
yardsticks to measure every step that it takes.
------~
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Croatia is seen in this concept as an important
link between Central Europe and the wider Balkans,
which gives it double importance but also makes it
a double possible beneficiary to play the role of a
driving engine.
This is the role that would be very much to
the liking of Draskovic, Gaj, Jelacic, Sokcevic,
Mazuranic, Kukuljevic, Vranyczany, Archduke
Ferdinand, Supilo, Radic and Macek, and chimes
well with the idea of Scandinavization and broader
visions of Franjo Tudrnan.
For this supposedly privileged role - for which
Croatia should be grateful- there is for the time be-
ing only one fundamental obstacle in the view of most
members and agents of the international community.
The free elections inaugurated a Croatian
model of democracy and system of government,
which removed the Communist system and subse-
quently changed political and economic structures
in line with the more successful countries of the
former Warsaw Pact and present-day E.U. and NATO
candidates. This system is satisfactory and accept-
able to an important part of the Croatian electorate,
while for the majority in the international commu-
nity it still does not possess enough attributes of a
totally open democracy. Additionally, it carries the
burden of long-term obligations with respect to the
Dayton Accords.
The Relevance of the European Standards
The international community considers that
in the wake of the breakdown of Yugoslavia and
preparations for self-defence there appeared an ex-
cessively single-party system, inadequate legislative
protection and media freedoms, legally camouflaged
persecution of the media, and a widely criticized
electoral law. In spite of its very good constitution,
positive macro-economic indicators, undeniable
military and other successes, Croatia is perceived as
insufficiently European and excessively nationalist.
Speaking of nationalism, not every form of
nationalism should be a priori and uncritically dis-
missed. It can prove an ally in the building of de-
mocracy and free civil society when it is an expres-
sion of a desire to correct obvious historical injus-
tice, tyranny, suppression of identity, and economic
exploitation.
However, once these injustices have been cor-
rected, nationalism should not be allowed to develop
into a penn anent state and offered as a pat answer to
any problems and challenges. If this should happen,
it becomes a hindrance or an excuse for the exclu-
sion of others.
CROATIAN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS REVIEW
Croatia tends to advertise itself as a regional
military power, which could be understood by some
people as a form of threat and as such incompatible
with the European views, especially not for the so-
cial-democrat, left-liberal and green parliamentar-
ians, who occupy dominant positions in the Euro-
pean Parliament and many national parliaments.
An added problem cited by the international
community at the present time, more as lip service
than a genuine humanistic attitude, is the problem
of return of Croatian citizens with the internation-
ally recognized right of citizenship, the return of their
property and housing, and their equal participation
in the civil society of their country. It must be said
that there are some objective grounds for such ap-
prehensions.
As events evolve and concrete problems ap-
pear, the international community modifies, removes
or imposes its conditions in accordance with the
momentary needs and interests and in keeping with
its priorities. This leaves the impression of a set of
instruments that can be arbitrarily used.
As for Croatia, the government, the parliamen-
tary majority, much of the media and a large propor-
tion of the Croatian public opinion have their own
assessments of the views of the international com-
munity. Their assessments are based on living reali-
ties, our moral and material capabilities, but just as
in any other country - regardless of the desire for
consensual cooperation - there are technical, finan-
cial, security and domestic policy limits. Nobody can
deny that the main interest of a country is the integ-
rity of its borders and security within the state.
I....
The Croatian citizens should realize - which
is neither easy nor, over a short tenn, with events
still fresh in the people's minds, actually possible-
that it is necessary, in the interest of a nation with
European and humanistic traditions, to balance and
relativize the cardinal syndrome that blurs our vi-
sion, namely, the attitude towards the Serbs. A simi-
lar syndrome exists among many Serbs and
Montenegrins and prevents rational thinking, debate
and constructive action. Reconciliation, settlement
of disputes and accounts is inevitable. Similar con-
siderations apply to relations with the Muslims.
There is a basic misunderstanding between the
interested parties. Many people in Croatia and in the
world see that the international community's stand
towards Croatia is one-sided, more severe, almost
less just than towards many other countries which
are now closer to being integrated into Europe. Such
misunderstandings should be overcome through con-
sensus and constant effort on both sides.
..•.•
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The situation just described needs to be
noted, but should not be given too much weight.
Such misunderstandings should not be the
reason for an isolationist reflex in Croatia, but an
incentive for more resolute steps to open small
country, with only 4,784,000 inhabitants, to the rest
of the world. This can be done in the first place
relying on a clear and decisive economic develop-
ment programme, designed to develop weakened,
inefficient economy, suffering from chronic short-
ages of finance. In addition, there is a need for for-
eign investments and technological and marketing
know-how. This is required to stimulate the growth
of production and exports, development of more
profitable tourism, rational agriculture, stronger
small businesses, intensified scientific research, all
ofthis in the interest of creating more jobs. Such a
bold economic programme should be accompanied
by a harmonization of our legislative, free market,
financial, health, scientific and other systems with
the European standards in these areas.
Simultaneously with the improvement of
democratic system, Crotia's significant economic
results would enable it, following the inclusion in
the PHARE programme and the signing of the first
agreement with the European Union, to speed up
the process of preparing an agreement on associa-
tion and possibly catch up with the second-circle
candidates for future membership in the E.U.
In the words of Croatian President, Croatia
now finds itself at the point at which it should spare
no effort to become part of the E.U. and NATO.
Croatian population know very well that this is their
national interest.
The entry into the European Union and
NATO is a crucial step for Croatia and for future
generations and therefore requiring a consensus of
all citizens to secure interests and the hard won
and defended identity. Such decisions are not a task
for one group or party in any country. The decision
depends on the democratically elected bodies, par-
liaments, and on the consensus of the citizens.
It is well known that in most E.U. countries
with a highly praised democratic models of value
and tolerance there are social injustices, corrup-
tion, unemployment, frequent protests and strikes,
decline in social values, drug abuse, organized
crime and criminal enrichment, interference of eco-
nomic interests in the media, illegal financing of
political parties, and many other deficiencies of the
kind that Croatia is reproached with. But in this
array of negative traits there is room also for Euro-
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pean humanistic views, Christian tradition,
multiethnic and multireligious tolerance, multiparty
civil society, and global economic interaction. How-
ever, such societies have at their disposal demo-
cratic instruments for the correction of mistakes
and possible amendments and improvements. Such
societies involve their citizens in the process of
transparent control. Free exchange of goods and
services and collective efforts make possible the
growth of the gross domestic product and personal
income of every citizen of that community, espe-
cially in the less developed regions. Taken as a
whole, this is not such a bad programme. The ma-
jority of the Croatian political and civic public opin-
ion accepts this concept. Finally, it must be kept in
mind that there are 360 million citizens in the E.U.
and that there will be 450 million in a few years.
Croatia is much smaller: our population is not much
more than that of a major European city.
Main tenet is that the Republic of Croatia
cannot accept the loss of its sovereign or political
powers, except those, one day, that the other mem-
bers of the European Union voluntarily surrendered
when they joined the E.U.
There are two views within the European
Union on the structural integration of that organi-
zation. One view, advocated by Germany and re-
cently somewhat weakened, sees it as a federation
of European states; the other view, proposed by
France, prefers a union of interest of equal nations.
The latter view, would be acceptable to a majority
of Croatian citizens.
Compared with other candidates, as already
noted, Croatia's position is more difficult and ac-
tually atypical. This should not discourage it, but
rather prompt it to bring together all social, eco-
nomic and political forces for a joint effort to start
on this path, never losing sight of national interest.
Croatia's foreign policy derives from the ba-
sic economic and security interests of its citizens.
It must be rooted domestically and remain open
and acceptable to a large selection of its citizens.
One of the tasks of the Croatian Government and
its diplomacy is to create the conditions in which
its bilateral relations and relations with multina-
tional organizations and communities can proceed
on an equal footing, in a gentlemanly fashion, re-
sponsibly, without imposition, and with a desire
for effective cooperation in dignity and reasonable-
ness within the limits of the possible. •
